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In the context of increasing digitalization and net-
working, the importance of cyber security for fam-
ily businesses is also growing and is moving onto 
the management agenda as a cross-divisional, 
group-wide challenge. A study of 184 German com-
panies shows that although family businesses iden-
tify cyber security as a relevant field of action, they 
do not take sufficient account of the organizational 
framework and process implementation. This paper 
is dedicated to the investigation of this phenome-
non. Possible causes of this phenomenon are dis-
cussed. Based on this, recommendations for action 
are given.  
 
1. Introduction  
In the course of increasing digitalization, family 
businesses are also becoming an ever greater target for 
hackers and are thus exposed to cyber attacks [1]. 
Since family businesses are known for their particular 
ability to innovate and usually still cooperate, attack-
ers can target their specialized knowledge as well as 
understand that family businesses can be a useful 
channel for larger organizations through the supply 
chain. In addition, family businesses are often per-
ceived to be insufficiently mature in the area of cyber 
security [1]. As such, family businesses are attractive 
targets for cyber attackers.  
According to the National Institute of Standards 
and Technology (NIST), cybersecurity is the "ability 
to protect or defend the organization from cyber at-
tacks"[2]. A lack of protection against cyber attacks 
can lead to business interruption or downtime, as well 
as significant incident investigation and IT system re-
covery costs. Claims for damages against companies 
due to delayed deliveries, damage due to data loss, 
damage to reputation [3] or disadvantages due to re-
duced competitiveness should also not be underesti-
mated [4]. According to the results of a study by the 
German Federal Association for Information Technol-
ogy, Telecommunications and New Media 
(BITKOM), the overall economic damage caused to 
companies in Germany by cyber attacks in the last two 
years amounts to 205.7 billion euros [5]. 
There is a discussion in the literature about the 
"readiness" of German companies for cyber attacks. 
Literature research [6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11] as well as em-
pirical data [12, 13] show that a holistic approach [14, 
15], which integrates cyber security into organization-
wide procedures and processes, is particularly relevant 
here. This means that even family businesses must 
take measures not only at the technological level but 
also at the organizational and process level to achieve 
an appropriate level of cyber security. In order to se-
cure an organization, all employees must act in a risk-
reducing manner. The organization can be seen as a 
system consisting of complementary roles. The effec-
tiveness of cybersecurity depends crucially on how ex-
plicitly the tasks are assigned to the various roles and 
how motivated and capable the holders of these roles 
are to perform the tasks assigned to them. Therefore, 
the performance of employees is a function of both the 
organization and the individual [16].  
As organizational implementation measures to 
avoid risks and to strengthen resistance in the event of 
a cyber attack, internal rules, such as protocols and 
guidelines, are essential in order to commit the mem-
bers of the organization to certain procedures [17]. In 
addition to organization charts, these internal guide-
lines define who is responsible for which intermediate 
step and which areas are involved in decisions, and for 
which forms of action it is ensured that the individual 
measures are determined as planned. Structuring in 
terms of responsibilities, communication and deci-
sion-making processes enables decision-makers to 
take appropriate measures and make decisions even 





under time pressure [4]. This is the only way to limit 
the damage caused by a cyber attack, which is ulti-
mately unavoidable, and to ensure the fastest possible 
uninterrupted continuation of business activities. 
So far, there is little knowledge about the percep-
tion, dissemination and implementation of an organi-
zational framework for cyber security in family busi-
nesses. However, earlier studies show that family busi-
nesses are generally less organized than non-family 
businesses, e.g. family businesses use management 
and management accounting tools to a lesser extent 
and are less inclined to set up independent manage-
ment accounting departments than non-family busi-
nesses [18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23]. Therefore, the focus of 
this paper is on the following research question:  
Do German family firms show peculiarities in re-
gards to organizational cyber security in comparison 
to non-family firms? 
This paper examines this question on the basis of 
an empirical survey of 184 German companies. 
The further course of this paper is as follows: 
Chapters 2 and 3 describe the relevant theoretical 
foundations. Hypotheses are derived on this basis. 
Subsequently, in chapter 4 the survey design and the 
sample are described before the respective empirical 
results are presented. In chapter 6, a short conclusion 
is drawn and recommendations for action are given.  
2. Theory  
2.1 Family businesses 
The term "family business" is not uniformly de-
fined in the economic literature [24, 25], which makes 
it difficult to quantify. Family businesses can be large 
as well as small and medium-sized enterprises con-
trolled by a family [26]. The main distinguishing fea-
ture of the criterion for defining family enterprises is 
the level of ownership of the family [27, 28]. 
Due to the influence of the respective families, 
family businesses have some qualitative peculiarities. 
First, family businesses are known for their long-term 
orientation compared to other companies. This is due 
to the fact that many entrepreneurial families focus on 
passing on the business to the next generation [29, 30]. 
As a rule, this means that long-term success is given 
much more weight than short-term profit [30]. This 
could have an impact on cyber security in that the fam-
ily business is willing to make a high short-term in-
vestment in cyber security to protect intangible assets 
in the long term. Second, family businesses differ from 
publicly traded companies in the power or influence of 
the entrepreneurial family. Compared to the power of 
small shareholders in publicly traded companies, it is 
significantly greater. The family is thus comparatively 
well placed to assert its own interests in the company. 
This power of the entrepreneurial family can also have 
a concrete impact on cyber security. In many cases, it 
enables family members to access company infor-
mation on an ad hoc basis. For example, if a family 
member can spontaneously seek a conversation with 
the CISO or another manager responsible for cyber se-
curity, the need for formal regular reporting is less. As 
a third characteristic, family businesses place more 
emphasis on non-financial aspects than non-family 
businesses.  
For example, many family businesses combine the 
reputation of the company with the reputation of the 
family. As a result, the non-financial goal of maintain-
ing reputation is given significantly more weight than 
in non-family businesses. The goal of preserving the 
company for the next generation and passing it on to 
the next generation, or other goals refer to values 
within the company and to positive effects of the com-
pany on the family, such as strengthening family co-
hesion. In some cases, it may also be a family goal - 
without regard to the economic impact - that coopera-
tion within the company is based more on trust and less 
on control. The way in which cyber security is man-
aged is influenced by the specifics of family busi-
nesses and may be less formalized than in non-family 
businesses, for example. 
2.2 Organizational aspects of cyber security 
It is necessary to enforce the cyber security process at 
all levels and thus influence the organizational struc-
ture [31]. Different groups of experts need to work to-
gether to create both effective and efficient structures 
for cyber-risk management, cyber-security control and 
monitoring. The necessary cooperation of all actors in-
volved must be organized in a consistent role and re-
sponsibility structure, especially to avoid gaps and 
frictional losses [32]. In order to ensure that each indi-
vidual project process complies with the company's 
cyber-security guidelines, which have been issued 
from the outset, it is first and foremost crucial to es-
tablish an organizational framework that is aligned 
with the company's strategy; the translation of an ab-
stract management task into an operational and struc-
turally manageable material [33]. Depending on the 
organization's own cyber security requirements, we 
strongly recommend the use of frameworks such as 
COBIT and COSO [14, 15] as a reference for building 







2.2.1 Process  
In order to operate a proactive cyber risk manage-
ment, the introduced process should include the fol-
lowing functions. First of all, it is crucial to perform 
appropriate activities to identify the occurrence of a 
cyber security event or to determine the key cyber 
risks, risk appetite, and assessment of controls and vul-
nerabilities [2, 10]. Therefore, it is primarily necessary 
to define and understand the business model, business 
objectives and assets of the organization in order to de-
termine the relevance of IT to the business and ulti-
mately agree on a level of cyber security [34, 35]. Af-
ter the identified cyber risks and their relevance to the 
organization have been analyzed, they must each be 
quantified, assessed and evaluated in terms of proba-
bility of occurrence and potential impact [10], e.g. us-
ing a risk matrix [34, 35, 36]. From there, organiza-
tional measures can be developed and implemented to 
address risks that exceed the risk appetite of the organ-
ization. In addition, it is imperative to continuously 
monitor and proactively control cyber-risks in terms of 
their relevance to the organization, including sched-
uled board-level status updates on top cyber-risks, 
treatment strategy and remediation actions [10]. In ad-
dition, the adequacy of risk management measures 
must be regularly reviewed (risk control) [34, 35, 36]. 
In addition, it is essential to develop and implement 
appropriate activities to take action in response to a de-
tected cyber security event [2]. This includes contin-
gency planning, which, in addition to an emergency 
team as a core element, includes the response plan for 
cyber incidents. This plan defines immediate reactions 
and contains specifications taking into account tech-
nical, organizational, communication and legal chal-
lenges [37].  
This creates the prerequisite for the company not 
being forced to act exclusively in a reactive manner, 
but rather being able to control and act [4]. In addition, 
the internal threat posed by human behavior should not 
be neglected. Raising the cyber security awareness of 
all employees, e.g. in the form of training and instruc-
tions [38], should be an essential part of a cross-com-
pany security concept. Finally, a set of policies, proce-
dures, guidelines and standards is of little use if they 
are not used and implemented by employees. In this 
respect, the establishment of a cyber security culture 
can make a decisive contribution to increasing cyber-







2.2.2 CISO  
To ensure effective and efficient prevention cyber 
resilience, it must be clearly regulated and communi-
cated who is responsible for cyber security at an oper-
ational management level. It should be mandatory to 
establish a single point of contact for security issues, 
coordination, management and communication of the 
information security process [31]. In this context, 
knowledge recording, knowledge sharing and succes-
sion planning to avoid critical dependencies on key 
persons naturally also plays a major role [31]. Due to 
the increasing demands on cyber security management 
and its degree of complexity, more and more compa-
nies are not only adapting existing management posi-
tions, such as those of the CIO, but are also creating 
new positions, such as the position of the CISO. The 
CISO is usually responsible for implementing the 
cyber security strategy. Thus the CISO does not only 
have to take on responsibility as a technical manager 
but rather as business visionary, innovator and strate-
gist, driving both change and strategic initiatives [40]. 
A lot of leadership energy must be put into breaking 
down the cultural barriers between IT and the core or-
ganization. CISOs therefore must educate the employ-
ees of the business potentials of technology to achieve 
a change in mindset [41]. For this reason the CISO 
should not only be an excellent communicator [40]. In 
this respect expertise, credibility including stature and 
prestige in the organization, political access to senior 
management and control of rewards and sanctions are 
key success factors [42]. 
3. Hypotheses  
A possible cause for the existing phenomenon that 
family businesses are well aware of the importance of 
cyber security, but the degree of implementation of 
measures and the establishment of systematic cyber 
security management is insufficient, could be due to 
the "socio-emotional wealth" (SEW) in family busi-
nesses.  
The inventors of this approach postulate that in 
family businesses the founding family sometimes does 
things that are negative for the company. In contrast to 
previous approaches, the SEW goes further in that it 
does not generally assume that family businesses have 
a more unprofessional approach. Rather, the point is 
that family businesses are well aware in the area of 
methods and instruments that their use can be positive 
for the company. It is assumed, however, that the fam-
ily does not use these instruments in some cases be-
cause the formalization that goes along with them 
makes knowledge available to other decision makers 
and therefore the position of the family in the company 
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becomes less important. The SEW suspects that the 
family is weighing up the pros and cons and deciding 
against the continued existence of its own company 
out of self-interest and thus by deliberately not imple-
menting certain methods and instruments. 
The origins of the SEW approach are related to the  
emergence  of  research  contributions  from Gómez-
Meija et al. [28], in which non-financial questions  
were  explained  as  the  key  to  the performance of 
family businesses, which were taken into account by 
emotional requirements such as reputation issues, the 
family friendliness itself and their influence on exter-
nal factors and follow-up discussions [28]. 
Berrone et al. [43] prove that SEW is the most  im-
portant  characteristic  parameter  for explaining the 
behavior of family businesses. Developments in the-
matically subdivided silos include among others risk 
management [28] and organizational structure [44]. 
It is assumed that family businesses have the nec-
essary knowledge in dealing with cyber security and 
see the necessity of establishing a holistic approach 
but refrain from implementing it for fear of losing con-
trol. This should explain why family members occa-
sionally behave opportunistically; they do so in order 
to protect their socio-emotional assets, even if this en-
tails financial costs [45]. Instead of leveraging mana-
gerial levers in a way that builds a cyber security cul-
ture driving cyber security behavior to prevent, detect 
and respond to cyber attacks effectively, family busi-
nesses are often prepared to take considerable business 
risks by diversifying less, only to preserve SEW as a 
consequence [43]. One reason for this is that owners 
of a family business often associate their identity with 
the organization, they are proud to be part of a family 
business [30]. Usually the company even bears the 
name of the family [43]. The possible sources of SEW 
are manifold, taking into account authority and power, 
status and prestige, succession and duty as well as cap-
ital formation and altruism [46]. 
Based on the SEW theory, the following hypothe-
ses are formulated:  
Previous studies show that family businesses de-
vote fewer resources to training and attach less im-
portance to education and have smaller proportion of 
managers with a university degree. Furthermore they 
give less importance to the improvement of detailed 
and rigorous management planning and are prone to 
underemploy management accounting techniques 
[47]. Management accounting techniques are method-
ically structured tools that solve problems of manage-
ment accounting and are usually supported by IT in 
companies. Examples are investment calculations, 
budgeting, transfer prices and the balanced scorecard. 
This lack of formalization is argumentatively trans-
ferred to the field of cyber security. 
Even though family businesses may be well aware 
of the importance of cyber security, we therefore as-
sume that they are not as well prepared in terms of hav-
ing implemented a cyber incident response compared 
to non-family businesses due to their fear of losing 
control. The typical reaction to a cyber attack is a so-
called cyber incident response plan (CIRP). 
We therefore formulate as follows:  
 
H1: Family businesses show lesser rates of imple-
mentation of a CIRP than non-family businesses. 
 
Previous studies show that family businesses are 
generally less sensitized to risks and their economic 
evaluation in the area of risk management. This is 
shown, among other things, by the fact that family 
businesses, although they are generally more long-
term oriented, do not implement this long-term orien-
tation methodically. They use fewer methods and in-
struments such as scenario techniques, sensitivity 
analyses and simulations. Fluctuation margins are less 
often taken into account in planning [48]. For the pre-
sent study, it is therefore assumed that family busi-
nesses are less aware of the significance of cyber risks 
in the area of cyber security and therefore consider 
them to be strategically less relevant for their com-
pany. Quantifiable risks are captured insufficiently, at 
the most qualitatively clustered. We therefore formu-
late as follows:  
 
H2: Family businesses quantitatively assess cyber 
risks with less formal methods than non-family busi-
nesses. 
 
Family businesses have implemented less formal-
ized systems and are as well often lacking documenta-
tion and reporting compared to non-family businesses 
[45]. Therefore, family businesses might be less sensi-
tized to detecting security vulnerabilities.  
We therefore formulate as follows:  
 
H3: Family businesses are slower to detect security 
vulnerabilities than non-family businesses.  
 
Previous studies show that family-owned busi-
nesses are less likely to establish independent control-
ling departments than non-family businesses [8]. The 
same applies to positions such as Chief Compliance 
Officer (CCO) [49]. For the present study, it is there-
fore assumed that family businesses overall are less 
differentiated in their organization and therefore do 





H4: Family businesses are less likely to hire a CISO 
than non-family businesses.  
4. Methodology 
4.1 Methodology and design  
The data collection was carried out using a stand-
ardized online questionnaire with open and closed 
questions. To check the questionnaire, a pre-test with 
several test persons was first conducted. Two were 
owners of family businesses, one was the CISO of a 
family business and one was an IT consultant. Subse-
quently, the actual survey was conducted between Oc-
tober and December 2019. For this purpose, the e-mail 
addresses of German companies were randomly se-
lected in advance using the Nexis database, which in-
cludes both German family and non-family busi-
nesses. The study does not claim to be representative; 
it aims to collect a broad opinion on cyber security. 
The company sizes were limited to 50 employees and 
10,000 workers.  
A total of 14,495 companies were contacted by e-
mail, of which 1,612 e-mails could not be delivered. 
Thus 12,883 companies received the link to the online 
survey. The online questionnaire was accessed 415 
times during the survey period, which corresponds to 
a participation rate of 3.22 percent. 372 companies an-
swered the questions asked, with 188 companies hav-
ing ended the survey early (usage rate: 89.64 percent). 
This brings the sample size to 184 companies and the 
response rate to 1.43 percent. For the study, we con-
ducted a test for non-response bias according to Arm-
strong/Overton (1977) [50] by examining the first and 
last third of responses for differences in structure and 
content. There was no evidence of bias. 
In this context, it should be noted that individual 
questions may nevertheless be mentioned differently, 
as partial non-response (item non-response) was not 
considered in this report. This is due to the fact that the 
questionnaire was deliberately designed without the 
specification of mandatory questions, since in some 
cases very topic-specific and sensitive data was que-
ried. The data was evaluated using Microsoft Excel 
and SPSS.  
4.2 Characterization of the sample  
55 percent of the surveyed companies operate in 
the legal form of a limited liability company (GmbH), 
24 percent as a limited partnership with a limited lia-
bility company as general partner (GmbH & Co. KG), 
6 percent of the companies to be examined wear the 
legal form of a stock corporation (AG), 2 percent are 
formed as a limited partnership (KG) and 1 percent as 
an economic company constituted under civil law 
(GbR). 11 percent state that they have a different legal 
form.  
24 percent of the companies are active in the ser-
vice sector, 17 percent in mechanical and plant engi-
neering and 9 percent in the automotive industry. 6 
percent of the subject group are logistics companies, 3 
percent medical technicians. The remaining 42 percent 
are assigned to another industry.  
In terms of company size, the surveyed companies 
have an arithmetic mean of 714 million euros in terms 
of turnover and an arithmetic mean of 974 employees 
in terms of staff numbers.  
54 percent of the companies surveyed are family 
businesses. Therefore, 46 percent are non-family 
firms. 
The test persons were also asked to state their po-
sition in the company. Of the respondents, 54 percent 
are employed in IT. 28 percent state that they belong 
to company management. In addition, 4 percent work 
in management accounting, 2 percent in human re-
sources, another 2 percent in production and 9 percent 
in other corporate areas. 
4.3 Independent variables 
The independent variable in the study is family in-
fluence. There are several operationalizations for this 
variable in the literature [51] [52] [53] [54]. Since the 
companies in the survey are primarily small and me-
dium-sized enterprises and family businesses, which 
tend to answer less when questions are too complex, a 
single-item approach was chosen for the present study. 
To measure family influence, a 0/1 coded question "Is 
your company a family business" was used, which 
yields the variable FAMILY. Of the 184 companies in 
the study, 106 are family enterprises and 78 are non-
family enterprises. 
4.4 Dependent variables 
A different dependent variable was defined for 
each of the four hypotheses. 
For H1 the dependent variable is the existence of a 
reaction plan (REAC_PLAN). The variable was meas-
ured at binary level 0=no and 1=yes. 
For H2 the dependent variable is whether there are 
methods for cyber risk assessment (ASSESS_METH). 
The issue was whether companies were using a cyber-
risk measurement methodology with categories such 
as high/medium/low or maturity models. This was also 
measured in binary on the 0/1 scale. 
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For H3 the dependent variable is SPEED. This var-
iable was measured in four steps: 1=less than 1 day; 
2=1-7 days; 3=1-4 weeks; 4=more than one month. 
For H4 the dependent variable CISO. This variable 











Unfortunately, the target group of family busi-
nesses has a tendency to quickly abandon empirical 
surveys in the case of many multi-item scales or ordi-
nal variables. Measuring several variables using bi-
nary constructs is therefore a painful but necessary 
compromise in questionnaire design and evaluation. 
4.5 Control variables 
As a control variable, as in other, organization-re-
lated studies [55], the company size was also chosen 
as a complexity-generating factor. The size of the en-
terprise - variable SIZE - was operationalized by the 
number of employees. The number of employees was 
surveyed in four classes: 
- SIZE_99: enterprises with up to 99 employees 
(n=34); 
- SIZE_100_999: enterprises with between 100 
and 999 employees (n=122); 
- SIZE_1000_9999: companies with between 
1,000 and 9,999 employees (n=17); 
- SIZE_10000: enterprises with 10,000 or more 
employees (n=4). 
The class up to 99 employees was chosen as the 
reference class. 
 
5. Empirical Results 
 
Various regression models were used to test the hy-
potheses depending on the scale level of the dependent 
variables. The following section first shows the corre-
lations of the variables processed in the study. For each 
logistic regression model, the ß-coefficient describes 
the regression coefficient of logistic regression, and 
Sig. shows the probability of the Wald statistics. As 
for the significances: * Significance at the 10% level 
(Wald test); ** Significance at the 5% level (Wald 













Table 1 shows the correlations in the sample. At 
first glance, family businesses seem to have a response 
plan less frequently, a method for assessing cyber-
risks less frequently and CISO less frequently. Com-
panies with more than 1,000 employees are more 
likely to have formal assessment methods. Companies 
with more than 1,000 employees also have more fre-
quent CISOs. The emergency response plan, the as-
sessment and the CISO variable correlate signifi-
cantly. 
5.2 Test of hypothesis 1 




The model quality and the explanatory contribu-
tion in this model are not particularly good at just 3.4 
MODEL 1
Dependent Variable REAC_PLAN
Independent Variable ß-Coeff. Sig.







Cox and Snell R² 0.034
Nagelkerkes R² 0.047
Table 1: correlations 
Table 2: Test of hypothesis 1 
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percent. Nevertheless, it is shown that family busi-
nesses have a significantly lower probability of having 
an emergency response plan. H1 is confirmed. 
5.3 Test of hypothesis 2 
A binary logistic regression was created for H2. 
 
 
Family businesses are less likely to have assess-
ment metrics for cyber risk. Larger companies with 
more than 1,000 employees do. H2 is thus confirmed. 
Goodness-of-fit for this model, measured with 
Nagelkerkes r², is relatively good at 14.9 percent. 
5.4 Test of hypothesis 3 
A linear regression was performed for H3. 
The model does not provide sufficient model qual-
ity and there are no significant results. H3 is rejected. 
In addition, the adjusted r² shows that the model is not 
really well suited to analyze this question. 
5.5 Test of hypothesis 4 






Model 4 delivers the expected results. Family busi-
nesses have significantly less CISO. In contrast, com-
panies with more than 1,000 employees have a CISO 
more often. H4 is confirmed. In addition, the good-
ness-of-fit – measured with Nagelkerkes r² - is rela-
tively good at 25.8 percent. 
6. Discussion and conclusion  
For companies of all sizes, information has become 
a decisive competitive factor, which they protect in-
tensively. Literature research and empirical data show 
that this protection must not only meet technical, but 
above all organizational requirements.  
The present study examined the status quo of or-
ganizational cyber security at 184 German companies. 
The manuscript thus moves in an interesting field 
of tension between family businesses, SMEs, organi-
zational routines and cyber security. Even though it 
has already been established that there is still some 
catching up to do in the area of cyber security in the 
Anglo-American and SME sector, we do not believe 
that German companies or the subgroup of family 
businesses have been influenced in this way in the lit-
erature to date. 
It is confirmed that family businesses do indeed 
have organizational catch-up needs to reduce their vul-
nerability to cyber attacks. The hypotheses regarding 
the influence of family influence have been largely 
confirmed. Family businesses and non-family busi-
nesses differ considerably in their assessment of cyber 
risks. The same applies to the implementation of a plan 
Model 2
Dependent Variable ASSESS_METH
Independent Variable ß-Coeff. Sig.
FAMILY -1.264 0.005 ***
SIZE100_999 0.048 0.933
SIZE1000_9999 1.419 0.049 **








Independent Variable ß-Coeff. Sig.
FAMILY -1.273 0.007 ***
SIZE100_999 0.709 0.288





Cox and Snell R² 0.150
Nagelkerkes R² 0.258
Table 4: Test of hypothesis 3 
Model 3
Dependent Variable SPEED
Independent Variable ß-Coeff. p-Value Tolerance VIF
FAMILY 0.069 0.617 0.998 1.002
SIZE100_999 0.029 0.862 0.746 1.340
SIZE1000_9999 0.011 0.968 0.779 1.284




F (Model, global) 0.682
Table 3: Test of hypothesis 2 
Table 5: Test of hypothesis 4 
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to respond to cyber incidents. Furthermore, family 
businesses are less likely to hire a CISO.  
This could be the result of a fear of losing control. 
Family members occasionally behave opportunisti-
cally to preserve their socio-emotional assets, even if 
this involves financial costs.  
Nevertheless, dealing with one's own level of cy-
bersecurity maturity means that one has to measure 
something - that one has some defined metrics. This 
raises awareness. A process that needs to be repeated 
regularly in order to reap the full benefits. That's why 
risk assessment is crucial to prevent the company from 
being compromised. This includes contingency plan-
ning, which includes an emergency team as well as the 
response plan for cyber incidents as a core element. 
This plan defines immediate responses and contains 
specifications taking into account technical, organiza-
tional, communication and legal challenges [37], 
which enable decision-makers to take appropriate 
measures and make decisions even under time pres-
sure. In addition, there must be someone in addition to 
top management who assumes responsibility primarily 
as a change agent. A so-called CISO, which primarily 
educates employees about the business potential of 
technology in order to achieve a change in mentality 
that overcomes the cultural barriers between IT and 
the core organization. 
The results show that non-family businesses 
clearly make a greater contribution to the holistic man-
agement of cyber risks and ensure that the process of 
cyber security is enforced at all levels. We therefore 
recommend that further research be conducted in this 
area to derive measures and, based on this, to develop 
tools that can help to further develop organizational 
cyber security in family businesses. 
From a theoretical point of view, it can be seen that 
the view postulated in the SEW that family businesses 
sometimes omit organizational aspects and routines in 
order to maintain their own position in the family net-
work can also be transferred to the area of cyber secu-
rity. However, if the lack of formal routines in areas 
such as management accounting or planning can be 
compensated by informal mechanisms such as trust, 
there is a suspicion that this will not be as successful 
for cyber security. However, we did not discuss this in 
the manuscript and unfortunately did not check it in 
questions and variables in the underlying survey. This 
should be an exciting question for qualitative and 
quantitative follow-up studies. 
Our study is subject to some limitations. These in-
clude the purely empirical approach with a rather low 
response rate and the focus on German companies. A 
national qualitative follow-up study as well as an in-
ternational quantitative study will follow. 
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